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The role of choice in the transition 
to a funded pension system 
 
 
Robert Palacios and Edward Whitehouse 
 
 
 
A critical question in the transition to a funded, private pension system is whether the new private 
element is presented as a mandate or choice to current and future workers.  This paper sets out the 
spectrum of available options and looks at policy in 13 reforming countries.  It concludes that older 
workers are best excluded from reform, because the economic benefits are small and the political 
resistance is likely to be large if they are included.  However, a defined cut-off age is arbitrary for 
reasons of intergenerational equity and heterogeneity of portfolio composition and risk preferences 
within cohorts.  A voluntary switch is preferred.  The main objection is the resulting uncertainty 
over the numbers switching.  Analysis of reforming countries shows however, a consistent and 
rational pattern of switching.  The paper concludes by discussing policy options for managing the 
switching process. 
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The role of choice in the transition 
to a funded pension system 
 
 
Robert Palacios and Edward Whitehouse1 
 
 
 
A number of countries have carried out fundamental reforms to their pensions systems and others 
are planning reform.  Previously, pensions were ‘defined benefit’ (i.e., the pension value depended 
on years of work and some measure of earnings), were financed on a pay-as-you-go basis (i.e., 
current contributions paid for current pensions) and were run by the state.  In each reform, part or 
all of the old pension system was replaced by ‘defined-contribution’ plans (where the pension value 
depends on individual contributions and investment returns), which are funded (i.e., each 
individual’s contributions pay directly for their pension benefits) and are run by private-sector 
pension providers.   
 The transition from a public-sector, pay-as-you-go pension system, into one in which at least 
part of pensions are provided by individual, privately managed pension accounts does not directly 
affect those receiving pensions at the time of the reform.  But it could affect all current and future 
workers in a country.  A critical issue that governments must resolve is the extent to which current 
and future workers will be allowed, encouraged or forced to switch their pension to the new private, 
funded element.  The answer to this policy question could be crucial to the success or failure of the 
entire reform.   
 The next section describes the range of options open to reforming governments.   The 
subsequent analysis shows that voluntary switching is the best strategy for meeting most of the 
reformer’s goals, including acceptance of the reform itself.  The principle argument against this 
strategy is the desire to control the pace of reform: specifically, the number of workers who switch.  
But switching behavior shows similar patterns in reforming countries that have offered some or all 
workers a choice.  A proper analysis allows policymakers to anticipate the broad pattern of switching 
and adjust incentives accordingly. We conclude with some implications for the design and 
implementation of pension reforms.    
                                                           
1  Pensions Economist, World Bank and Director, Axia Economics, respectively.  We would like to thank seminar 
participants at the World Bank — especially Estelle James and Michal Rutkowski — and Richard Disney of the 
University of Nottingham for helpful comments and advice.  The paper presents a personal view.  
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1. Policy options in the transition to a funded pension system 
 The first and most important choice for reformers is determining the balance between the 
pay-as-you-go and funded elements of the new pension system.  Some countries have opted for a 
complete shift to privately-managed, defined-contribution funds.  In others, only a part of 
mandatory pension contributions have been diverted to the new funded system, usually at least one 
quarter of total contributions.  Elsewhere, the new compulsory funded element has been additional 
to the existing pay-as-you-go system.   
The second issue is coverage: the extent to which the new private element is a choice or a 
mandate to current and future workers.2  Figure 1 shows the range of possible choices of second-
pillar coverage in the transition to a full or partially funded pension system. 
 
Figure 1.  Spectrum of switching strategies 
          
          
 voluntary for 
current and 
future workers 
compulsory only 
for new entrants 
compulsory for 
new and 
younger workers
compulsory for 
all workers 
 
 
At the left-hand side is an entirely voluntary switch.  All workers, including new entrants, 
have the option either of staying with the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go scheme or switching to the 
new funded, defined-contribution plan.  At the other end is an entirely compulsory switch, where 
pension rights in the old pay-as-you-go scheme are frozen and all new rights earned through the 
defined-contribution, funded plan.  In between are various combinations.  For example, current 
workers might have a choice between the new plans while new entrants are mandated to switch.  
Alternatively, older workers might be excluded from the new plan, while younger are forced to 
switch.  The policy options are not discrete, but instead lie along a spectrum of possible options.   
 
2. Policy choices in practice 
 The experience of 13 reforming countries is shown in Table 1.  The sample covers the entire 
spectrum of possible outcomes for switching policy.   
Three countries — Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Mexico — would be at the far right of Figure 1.  
They have forced all workers to switch to the private scheme.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
Argentina, Colombia, Peru and the United Kingdom.  They allow all workers, including those yet to 
reach the labor force, to choose between public, defined-benefit and private, defined-contribution 
schemes.  Croatia, El Salvador and Uruguay compel workers below a certain age to switch.  Poland 
has a similar proposal.  Finally, Hungary and Chile have allowed choice for those with rights in the 
old scheme but not for new labor-market entrants.   
 
                                                           
2  Other coverage issues — such as the inclusion of the self-employed, rural workers or civil servants and the role of the 
informal labor market — are not considered here.   
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Table 1.  Switching rules in selected pension reforms 
 Switching for 
new entrants 
Switching for 
current labor force 
Latin America   
Argentina (1994) voluntary voluntary 
Bolivia (1997) mandatory mandatory 
Chile (1981) mandatory voluntary 
Colombia (1994) voluntary voluntary 
El Salvador (1998) mandatory mandatory < 35 
voluntary 35-55 
Mexico (1997) mandatory mandatory 
Peru (1993) voluntary voluntary 
Uruguay (1996) mandatory mandatory < 40, 
higher income 
   
Other   
Croatia (1999) mandatory mandatory < 40 
voluntary 40-50 
Hungary (1997) mandatory voluntary 
Kazakhstan (1998) mandatory mandatory 
Poland (2000) mandatory mandatory < 30 
voluntary 30-50 
United Kingdom (1988) voluntary voluntary 
Note: Uruguay’s pension system is mandatory only for those earning more than 5,000 pesos per month (in 
1996).  Poland’s reform proposal is provisional and final details are undecided.  The maximum switching 
age for women in El Salvador is 50.  See list of references for sources. 
 
3. Guarantees and options to reverse the switching decision 
 These initial groupings mask some important differences in switching policy.  Unlike Bolivia 
and Kazakhstan, all current workers in Mexico are able to switch back to the public scheme on the 
day they retire (see Table 2).  This effectively provides a guaranteed rate of return in the private 
scheme equivalent to the implicit rate of return in the public plan.  In economic terms, workers have 
an option — to take the private, defined-contribution pension — that they did not have previously.  
They will exercise this option only if the benefit in the new scheme proves to be higher than in the 
old one.3  Since new entrants are not extended this guarantee, the Mexican reform is probably closer 
to the Chilean and Hungarian approaches. 
 The option to reverse the switching decision is also a feature of the reform in Colombia.  
Workers can switch back and forth between the public and private schemes every three years (Table 
2).  Unlike Mexico, however, new entrants and existing workers can choose the public scheme.  
                                                           
3  The Mexican reform also includes a flat payment to each individual defined-contribution account, which increases the 
rate of return in the private relative to the public scheme, see Grandolini and Cerda (1998).  
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Unlimited reversibility of the switching choice and defined benefit type guarantees distort 
behavior and create a contingent liability to the government.4  This liability, often ignored in the 
reform debate, could be quite large.  Its value depends on several unknown probabilities, including: 
• policy risk associated with the public scheme; 
• the net rate of return to the private pension investments; and 
• wage and employment patterns.   
These are in turn affected by the guarantee itself.  For example, the incentive for an individual to 
monitor investment performance and administrative costs is significantly reduced if it is very likely 
that he or she will receive the public pension regardless of net returns.  Other things constant, the 
higher the guarantee, the greater the number of people who will switch and the greater the 
contingent liability for government which is created.5   
 
 
Table 2.  Benefit guarantees in pension reforms 
 Option to return 
to public scheme 
Valuation of 
accrued rights 
Defined-benefit 
guarantee 
Latin America    
Argentina yes, for 2 years new DB formula no 
Bolivia no new DB formula no 
Chile no recognition bonds no 
Colombia yes, indefinitely recognition bonds yes 
El Salvador no recognition bonds no 
Mexico yes, indefinitely not applicable yes 
Peru yes, for 2 years recognition bonds no 
Uruguay no new DB formula no 
    
Other    
Croatia ? ? ? 
Hungary yes, for 2 years new DB formula yes 
Kazakhstan no new DB formula no 
Poland no notional capital no 
United Kingdom yes, indefinitely new DB formula no 
See notes to Table 1.  The last column refers to general defined-benefit guarantees as opposed to 
minimum pension guarantees, targeted on low-income workers.  Switching rules in Croatia are still under 
discussion at the time of writing.  See list of references for sources.   
 
 
4. The individual switching decision 
Diverting pension contributions from public, defined-benefit to private, defined-
contribution schemes affects each age cohort differently.  We assume that the rate of return, net of 
                                                           
4  In most countries (with the exception of the United Kingdom, see below), switching back is retrospective, in that 
accumulated funds in the defined-contribution account are surrendered in return for the defined-benefit promise.  The 
contingent liability to government in this case is therefore the difference between the defined-benefit right and 
accumulated funds in the account.   
5  See Pennacchi (1998) on the valuation of defined contribution pension guarantees.   
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transaction charges, in the private scheme is higher than the implied return in the public plan.6  The 
pay-as-you-go system is presumed to continue unaltered.  People opting for the funded system are 
assumed to divert the whole contribution to the defined-contribution pension account.   
As shown in Figure 2, the effect of compounding the higher return in the funded plan is to 
widen the gap between the expected pension provided by the private and public scheme according 
to the length of the accumulation period.  Younger workers, with more years of accumulation ahead, 
experience the largest gain.  Older workers, if forced to join the private scheme and forfeit all rights 
accumulated in the old scheme, would lose practically all of their pensions.  In the Figure, a 40-year-
old would expect to break even from the shift to the private scheme.  These differential accruals are 
standard characteristics: defined-benefit plans tend to have backweighted benefits (where pension 
rights are earned predominantly in later life) whereas compound interest means that defined-
contribution pensions tend to be frontloaded.   
 
 
Figure 2.  A stylized example of the switching decision 
pension
age
pay as you go
funded
40
retirement
age
 
Note: the funded pension is shown as a straight line for clarity and simplicity.  In reality, it will of course be 
a curve, concave to the origin, due to the compound-interest effect.   
The second column of Table 2 shows that all reforms to date have compensated workers for 
rights accrued in the pre-reform period.  This compensation rotates the funded line upward in 
Figure 2.  Its y intercept is unchanged because there is no effect on the new entrant who has not yet 
acquired defined-benefit rights. By adjusting the point at which these two lines cross, policymakers 
can effectively target the switching age and influence the pace of a voluntary transition.  We return 
to this link between the individual decision and fiscal policy in the next section.   
                                                           
6  This is an important reason for reform.  It is supported by empirical evidence from Latin America and the OECD (see 
OECD 1997) as well as evidence supporting the prevalence of the dynamic efficiency condition (Abel et al., 1989). 
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The analysis in Figure 2 has assumed a pay-as-you-go equilibrium, in which the implicit rate 
of return on the pay-as-you-go scheme is equal to the long-run rate of growth of the wage bill.  In 
practice, many pay-as-you-go schemes offer a higher implicit rate of return.  In the long-run, this 
either means contributions rates will have to rise to maintain pay-as-you-go equilibrium7 or the 
deficit in the public pension plan must be financed from general government revenues.  With such a 
scheme, the higher implicit rate of return in the pay-as-you-go scheme would imply that only the 
very youngest workers would voluntarily choose to switch.  Mandatory switching from the deficit-
financed pay-as-you-go scheme to the funded plan would be necessary.  But this would be politically 
difficult: indeed, as politically difficult as cutting pay-as-you-go benefits.  The result would be 
demands for better valuation of accrued rights and re-introducing the deficits.   
We argue that a better approach is to ensure that the pay-as-you-go plan is sustainable in the 
long-term, without large forecast rises in deficits or contribution rates, and that switching choice is 
then permitted. 
 
The role of uncertainty 
Figure 2 and the discussion above abstract from risk when comparing returns from financial 
assets with returns from participation in a pay-as-you-go scheme.  In fact, both types of pension 
involve uncertainty.8    
The public pension promise in many countries is vulnerable to inflation, both at the time the 
pension is calculated and during retirement. Although automatic indexation is common in most 
industrial countries, elsewhere inflation adjustments are irregular and often ad hoc.  During periods of 
high inflation, the real value of the pension can rapidly be eroded.  For example, the average real 
pension fell 30 per cent in Argentina between 1985 and 1992 and 40 per cent in Hungary during the 
1980s.  Current indexation regimes in Hungary and the United States only uprate pensions to two 
years before the year of retirement.9  
In some cases, the pension value may be subject to earnings uncertainty, particularly when 
final earnings or short averaging-periods are used as the base of the pension calculation.10   Most 
importantly, the poor financial prospects of most pay-as-you-go schemes and repeated instances of 
benefit reductions imply a significant ‘policy risk’ in the public scheme.11,12 The degree of policy risk 
will naturally depend on the finances of the scheme.  A sound plan with sustainable benefits and 
forecast contributions is more likely to be stable than a scheme where required contribution rates or 
transfers from the central government budget are forecast to rise.    
Most workers would trade their public-pension promise for a government bond of equal 
present value.  This suggests that the default premium for a pay-as-you-go pension promise would 
                                                           
7  Pay-as-you-go equilibrium requires that aggregate contributions and aggregate benefits are equal in each time period, 
otherwise, external sources of finance are required.  Long-run equilibrium occurs when the contribution rate is stable 
over time.  See Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse (1993) for a discussion.    
8  See Dilnot et al. (1994), section 5.2 and Brugiavini, Disney and Whitehouse (1993) for a detailed discussion of risk and 
uncertainty in different types of pension plans.   
9  Palacios and Rocha (1998) and United States Department of Health and Human Services (1996).   
10  See Dulitsky (1996a, b) and Bodie, Marcus and Merton (1988).   
11  Bodie (1990) terms this ‘social-insurance risk’.  See the discussion there, in Browning (1975) and the references in note 
6 on this issue.   
12 Many benefit cuts have been implemented through the ‘back-door’ route of changes to indexation.  For example, the 
United States suspended indexation for 1984, Belgium for the three years 1983 to 1985 and New Zealand for the two 
years 1992 and 1993 despite the fact that indexation was written into the law. 
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be higher than that for government bonds.13   The perceived risk is likely to vary between countries 
and over time.  It may be inversely correlated with the level of unfunded liabilities.    
Private pensions, in contrast, offer some insurance against policy risk.14  Governments are 
unlikely to confiscate private property.  However, there is some risk of effective confiscation, for 
example, through changes in tax policy, means tests for social assistance benefits or pension 
guarantees.15  The government also has an important role as regulator in ensuring private pensions 
funds deliver a reasonable return.  The existence of a well-functioning, competitive private pension 
sector is required both to maintain reasonable administrative costs and incentives to find 
investments with the best risk-reward profiles.  The regulatory environment must be strong enough 
to prevent fraud and protect consumers, but flexible enough to allow private funds to compete.  
Investment restrictions must not preclude a prudent amount of diversification between asset classes, 
including foreign assets.  
Private, defined-contribution pensions are also protected against earnings uncertainty, but 
are subject to capital-market risk, as the pension depends on the returns contributions earn.  At the 
same time, only the private funded component has the potential for international diversification, 
which can reduce country-specific risks.   
Private pensions can also be affected by inflation.  During retirement, many countries 
require annuities to be indexed for price rises, and this can be facilitated by issuing indexed bonds.  
During the accumulation period, the risk is not inflation per se, but whether high inflation results in a 
sustained period of negative real returns.16  Thus, inflation risk in defined-contribution schemes is 
really a form of capital-market risk.   
Pensions of all forms are risky. While the comparison between public and private outcomes 
remains problematic, the two options both involve risk to the individual facing the choice.  Which 
scheme is perceived to be riskier will vary from one country and one worker to another.   
 
Heterogeneous preferences 
Different workers will have different preferences for risk and different perceptions of the 
degree of risk particular choices entail.  Two cases are most relevant.   
First, age will affect preferences for risk.  Policy risk is a function of the time remaining until 
retirement; hence, it affects younger workers more than it affects older workers.  The tendency to 
phase in reform provisions and protect rights of those close to retirement suggests that this 
perception is rational.  In contrast, younger workers tend to have very little savings except in the 
form of their own human capital.  Some economists argue that these workers would find it 
advantageous to hold assets whose returns have a low correlation with their projected wages.17  For 
                                                           
13  This is partly because workers are not able to trade or borrow against their pension promises.  For a discussion, see 
Rizzo (1990). 
14  This is an argument for the introduction of a funded, privately-managed component to pensions.  See Mitchell and 
Zeldes (1996) for a justification of reform as political risk reducing in the United States.   
15  For example, the United Kingdom government abolished the dividend tax credit paid to tax-exempt institutions, 
including pension funds.  With the abolition of advance corporation tax announced in the November 1997 pre-budget 
report, the overall effect will be to reduce the rate of return on pension funds by 0.4 percentage points.  See Whitehouse 
(1998).   
16  See Hemming and Kay (1981).   
17  See Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996).   
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the young, investing in equities is an optimal portfolio strategy and moving to a defined-contribution 
scheme would allow significant gains from diversification.18   
Secondly, perceptions of different kinds of risk are likely to vary within as well as between 
age cohorts.  For most current workers, particularly the young, their most significant asset is their 
human capital (i.e., their future earnings).  They may wish to diversify their portfolio of assets away 
from pensions that also depend on future earnings (i.e., defined-benefit plans) and invest instead in 
the capital market (where returns will probably be only weakly correlated with individual earnings).  
Other individuals may prefer to avoid capital-market uncertainty.  Attitudes to risk depend on a 
range of characteristics, such as occupation and industry of work, and family type.  Workers, even of 
the same age, are heterogeneous in their attitudes to risk.   
People also differ in the types of assets they hold.  In addition to pension rights, individuals 
may own property, durable goods and liquid investments in equities, bonds or deposits.  People will 
naturally want to manage risk through diversification.  
A final issue is the relationship between switching and income.  Unfortunately, few data are 
available on the choices made by people at different income levels, but there is a natural suspicion 
that people with higher income levels are more likely to switch.  This may reflect rational decision-
making.  Even if the difference in the relative returns between the pay-as-you-go and funded options 
is large, for a low-income worker the absolute difference will still be small.  The search and 
information costs in deciding on the best option and choosing among competing funds might 
outweigh the gain.  Also, administrative costs in most reforming countries have a fixed element.  
Taking account of this cost, it may not be worth switching, because the contributions to the funded 
plan are swallowed up in charges.  These two reasons suggest it may be rational for a low-income 
worker not to switch, and that forcing them to switch would be suboptimal.  The counter-argument 
is that low-income workers are less financially sophisticated than their higher income peers, and so 
need to be forced into an option in their own interests.  There is no evidence either way. 
Since individual attitudes to risk vary and individuals’ portfolios vary, it is suboptimal either 
to require the whole of each heterogeneous cohort to switch or not to switch.19   
 
5. Switching policy and the objectives of pension reform 
A successful reform must meet a number of objectives.  First, the new scheme must provide 
a reasonable level of income support during old age.  This goal can be summarized by a target 
replacement rate.20  In Figure 2, the long-run replacement-rate target is the y intercept of the funded 
line.  In a partial move to funding, it would be the sum of benefits from the funded plan and the 
defined-benefit promise of the residual public scheme.    
Secondly, the benefit level must be consistent with long-run fiscal policy, especially the 
contribution rate needed to finance the system.  Short-run fiscal policy constraints must also be 
taken into account, since the diversion of payroll taxes to the funded scheme will increase deficits.  
                                                           
18  Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1998) suggest that liquidity constraints prevent younger workers from 
investing as much as they should in equities.  This behavior in turn may help explain the ‘equity premium’ or the excess 
risk adjusted return observed on equities as compared to short-term government bonds.  
19  Samwick (1997) explores a model of funding state pension benefits in the United States in which individual discount 
rates vary.  He shows that pension reform can be achieved at lower cost with a voluntary switch.   
20  While this discussion refers to average replacement rate (RR) targets, it is assumed that government intervention in 
some form will be required to provide a higher RR to lifetime low-income individuals.  
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However, it is important to recognize that standard fiscal accounting does not provide a clear 
picture of changing public-sector obligations during the transition from unfunded to funded 
schemes.21 
Thirdly, pension reform has microeconomic objectives, to improve the efficiency of the 
workings of the economy.  A well-designed reform should stimulate the development of pension 
funds as financial intermediaries, add liquidity to markets and contribute to capital-market 
development.  The reform might also have a positive impact on labor supply22, to the extent that it 
reduces the perceived tax component of pension contributions.  Contributions to the funded 
scheme might be seen as savings or deferred consumption, rather than a tax on labor income.23  It 
might also lead to a shift to from informal- to formal-sector jobs.24 
In addition to these economic objectives, political and legal constraints will often affect the 
policymaker’s choice of switching strategy.  For example, in some countries, there have been 
constitutional challenges of the valuation of accrued rights, forcing reformers to modify their 
original proposals.  More generally, a voluntary switch will be more acceptable to the public than 
others will.  In the United Kingdom, for example, the original proposals for reform in 1985 
envisaged doing away with the state-provided second pillar entirely, and replacing it with 
compulsory private provision.  Nigel Lawson, then finance minister, refused to countenance 
compulsion, seeing it as inconsistent with the Conservative administration’s ‘libertarian’ political 
philosophy.  Margaret Thatcher, then prime minister, insisted on compulsion to ensure an adequate 
retirement income, telling Lawson that this had long been the practice in Switzerland.  ‘But Prime 
Minister’, Lawson replied, ‘it is well known that in Switzerland everything that is not forbidden is 
compulsory.’25  Lawson’s view prevailed, and the state scheme remained alongside the funded, 
defined-contribution alternative.   
 
Trade-offs in switching strategies 
 The economic objectives of reform often conflict, particularly when it comes to deciding the 
pace of the transition.  This depends mostly on the age below which it becomes advantageous for 
worker to switch: the higher the target switching age, the faster the transition, ceteris paribus.   
 Figure 3 below illustrates three transition cases.  In the first, only new labor-market entrants 
have an incentive to choose the funded scheme.  The path of the resulting deficits and the 
accumulation of private pension savings are labeled (a).  The lines labeled (c) refer to the other 
extreme, in which there are incentives for all workers to switch regardless of age.  Finally, the lines 
labeled (b) refer to a ‘middle road’ in which half of the workforce (e.g., below age 35-40) is 
encouraged to switch to the funded scheme. 
                                                           
21  Several sources highlight the accounting problems related to the transition including, Kotlikoff (1987), Holzmann 
(1997) and Kane and Palacios (1998). 
22 For example, Feldstein and Samwick (1996) estimate that funding pensions in the Untied States would reduce the 
deadweight cost of the payroll tax by two per cent of the covered wage bill in the long run.  Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1995), however, find little evidence of changes in labor-force participation in a structural model even if reform induces 
major changes in pension benefits.   
23  Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1998) consider cases of full and no perception of the link between taxes and benefits 
in a study of potential reform with voluntary switching in the United States.   
24  Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) finds that switching to funded schemes can increase productivity by reducing the incentives to 
evade in a two-sector model of an economy with a relatively capital intensive formal sector.  
25  Lawson (1992), p. 590.  Lord Lawson was chancellor of the exchequer from 1983 to 1989 and Baroness Thatcher was 
prime minister from 1979 to 1990. 
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The slow transition case (a), results in low initial transition deficits and a very gradual 
accumulation of assets in the private pension sector.26  The opposite is true for case (c) where the 
initial transition deficits peak at the beginning and gradually disappear as the system finally pays off 
the last of the old obligations.  As discussed below, all of the countries that have allowed voluntary 
switching have opted for a variation of case (b).  This option, excluding older workers from the 
reform, is appealing for several reasons.   
   
 
Figure 3.  Transition deficit path under different switching-age targets 
Note:  Figure based on a hypothetical pay-as-you-go scheme with deteriorating demographics 
where contributions are constant and benefits reduced to maintain pay-as-you-go equilibrium.  
The funded scheme earns a rate of return two percentage points higher than wage growth.  The 
residual public, defined-benefit pension is reduced to maintain the path of total (public plus 
private) benefits before reform. 
 
 First, older workers have a reasonable expectation of the pension they will receive under the 
old regime.  Disrupting these expectations by switching them into a new system might be unfair; it is 
also likely to provoke the maximum political objections.   
Secondly, the economic impact of switching older workers will be small.  They will spend 
few years in the new scheme and so will build up only a small entitlement.  There will only be a 
short period for investment returns to compound, especially if start-up costs affect early commission 
structures.   
                                                           
26  Obviously, this will depend on the covered wage bill. 
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Thirdly, the short time horizon also means that returns will be more uncertain than for 
younger workers, for whom bad years and good years are likely to cancel out (if shocks to the rate of 
return are not persistent).   
Fourthly, the move to a funded scheme requires parallel reforms in financial markets and 
regulation.  In particular, shifting older workers would allow little time for development of the 
insurance sector and building annuities markets.   
Persuading older workers of the case to switch is likely to be expensive, either in terms of 
direct or implicit subsidies (through guarantees to the pension received in the new plan).  For these 
reasons, switching strategy (c) in Figure 3 or a mandatory switch applied to all workers is not 
optimal.27    
Older workers can be excluded by setting a mandatory cut-off age.  This strategy is likely to 
produce objections and the age chosen will inevitably be arbitrary.  The original plans in both 
Hungary and Argentina called for cut-off ages, of 47 and 45 respectively.  These were dropped after 
legal challenges.  Voluntary switching avoids these objections.   
On the other hand, there are two disadvantages to allowing older workers to continue to 
participate in the public scheme.  First, in reforms that eliminate the contribution based first pillar, it 
results in extra administrative costs during the period in which the old scheme continues to operate.  
Second, if there are no caps on the switching age some older workers may switch based on poor 
information.  This is a more general problem of ‘mis-selling’, which calls for government 
involvement in the dissemination of information about the reform (see section 8, below).   
 
Minimizing transition costs for a given target switching age 
We argued above that an essential reason for moving from pay-as-you-go to funded 
pensions is the additional return earned in capital markets, compared with the implicit return in a 
sustainable public scheme, which is the growth in the aggregate wage bill.  Both of these returns are 
subject to different kinds of risk, such as capital-market uncertainty and policy risk.  The empirical 
analysis below show that switching exceeded forecasts, suggesting that individuals’ perception of 
policy risk is that it is high and that some workers may have been over-compensated for switching.   
In a certain world, the excess return is the triangle between the funded and pay-as-you-go 
lines in Figure 2.  With other policies unchanged, this excess return results in a long-run increase in 
the replacement rate for the same level of contribution.  The area of the triangle also represents an 
opportunity cost to the government.  The empirical analysis of switching in the United Kingdom, 
below, shows that this opportunity cost can be very large.    
The government should appropriate this excess return, either by cutting the contribution 
rate to the funded part of the system, or reducing residual pay-as-you-go benefits or cutting the 
value of recognition bonds for younger workers (if the system is only partially shifted to funding).  
Lower contribution rates could have further economic benefits, by increasing labor supply and 
reducing evasion.  Lower pay-as-you-go benefit levels would help finance the transition deficit.  
Both of these policies can be achieved while keeping overall pension replacement rates constant.    
 
                                                           
27  Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1998) find that an option to switch in the United States would reduce the 
requirements on general revenue and speed the transition path compared with forced participation.   
12 
To what extent can the pace of reform be predicted or controlled? 
 Policymakers are often concerned with the short term fiscal implications of the switching 
process.  Since most reforms (10 out of 12 excluding Mexico for the reasons mentioned above) 
involve some element of voluntary switching, the analysis described above is crucial, both for 
anticipating and minimizing fiscal deficits by avoiding overcompensation of younger workers.  Many 
countries failed analyze incentives properly before introducing reform.     
In the following section, clear patterns of age-related switching corresponding to the above 
analysis emerge.  In all cases, the voluntary switch has resulted in a case similar to (b) in Figure 3, i.e., 
a gradual switch involving most young workers.  It should then be possible to anticipate a broad 
pattern, at least distinguishing the three cases presented in Figure 3.  This was the case in Hungary 
and Uruguay before implementation, and afterwards in the United Kingdom, as described below.   
 
 6. Experience with voluntary switching 
This section outlines experience in seven reforming countries that offered an option to 
switch between the public and private pension schemes: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Peru, 
Uruguay, and the United Kingdom.  
 
 Hungary 
 In Hungary, switching is compulsory for new labor-market entrants, but current workers 
have an option between a ‘modernized’ pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit pension and switching to a 
multipillar system.  A unique feature of the Hungarian reform is the extent to which analysis of the 
incentive to switch played an important role both in the design of the reform and in the switch itself, 
by providing information to workers.  A simple simulation model allows workers to input their 
personal information on earnings, career path, anticipated retirement age and expectation of rates of 
return.  The model then shows expected pension benefits in the modernized pay-as-you-go and 
multipillar pensions.   
 Figure 4 shows the results of the model for different age groups.  (This Figure is analogous 
to the stylized reform in Figure 2.)  The line shows the projected pension from the modernized pay-
as-you-go scheme.  The gradual decline in returns for younger cohorts reflects the shift to a gross-
wage-based formula and the gradual extension of the assessment period for individual earnings in 
the formula towards the full, lifetime earnings history.  The formula for the pay-as-you-go, defined-
benefit first pillar is changed in the same way, and so exhibits the same gradual decline for younger 
workers.  The white area shows the return to the second pillar.  This increases for younger cohorts 
due to the compound-interest effect.  The sum of the two gives the replacement rate in the 
multipillar system.  Comparing the two pension values, the multipillar system becomes attractive to 
workers in their early 30s or younger.   
The structure of incentives reflects two deliberate policy decisions.  First, the Hungarians 
were worried that switching would exceed expectations, and so the incentive to switch was 
deliberately made small (less than five percentage points addition to the replacement rate) and the 
switching breakeven age low.  In practice, the government would have been content with workers 
up to their early 40s switching to the new scheme, but did not want to build in a large incentive for 
them to do so.  Secondly, the new pension system is designed so that the long-run replacement rate 
of 60-65 per cent does not represent an increase on that in the current system.  With conservative 
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assumptions, roughly two thirds of the pension will come from the first pillar, and one third from 
the new first pillar.28   
 A complication in the analysis of switching in Hungary is a defined-benefit guarantee of the 
value of the second-pillar pension offered by the government.  This limits the potential losses from 
switching to the multipillar regime to about 10 per cent of the pay-as-you-go benefit.  Naturally, the 
guarantee has less value for younger workers who would have to experience highly unfavorable 
returns to trigger the guarantee.  Their switching behavior is not likely to be affected greatly.  There 
is also little effect on older workers because the guarantee is limited to workers with at least 15 years 
of contributions. The restriction on the loss from switching should encourage more switching at the 
margin.  
 
Figure 4.  Switching incentives in Hungary by age 
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Figure 4 shows preliminary data based on the first 50,000 Hungarians who have 
announced their decision to switch.  The data suggest that policymakers have achieved their 
switching objectives for the age structure of the reformed scheme thus far.  Unofficial reports 
from the pension supervision of the new private pension funds confirm the age pattern continues 
to hold as the number of voluntary switchers approaches the one-million mark. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Coverage of funded pensions in Hungary by age and sex, 1997 
                                                           
28  See Palacios and Rocha (1998) for a discussion of the Hungarian reforms.   
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from State Private Funds Supervision, Hungary (1997) 
 
United Kingdom 
 Two unique features of the pension system in the United Kingdom complicate the analysis 
of switching.  First, there was a large funded sector before reform.  This sector, consisting mainly of 
employer-run defined-benefit pensions, was already able to substitute for the public-sector, defined-
benefit plan.  These employer-provided schemes covered 45-50 per cent of workers at the time of 
reform.  Secondly, those choosing the new funded, defined contribution ‘personal pensions’ were 
able to move back to the state scheme at any point in the future and switching was voluntary even 
for new labor-market entrants.  The appropriate choice variable in analyzing switching behavior is 
not the total pension earned from switching, but the marginal pension earned for each year the 
individual potentially might switch.  Figure 5 shows the incentive structure faced in the first years of 
the reform, 1988-92. 
 The Figure shows that increments to personal pensions are greater early on in life.  This 
weighting represents a compound interest effect and the declining value of the contribution that will 
be paid into the funded scheme as the public-sector, defined-benefit program matures.  This is 
because the rebate for contracting out of the state scheme, known by its acronym, SERPS,29 is 
designed on average to match the benefit the individual would have received from SERPS.  The 
SERPS curve, in contrast to that for personal pensions, is almost horizontal.  This results from the 
revaluation of individual earnings in early years in line with economy-wide earnings: uprating by 
prices, for example, would give an upward tilt to the curve.  The Figure shows optimum pension 
choice across the life cycle.  The individual would improve their pension by contracting out of 
SERPS: indeed, at age 20, the value of the rebate for that year is worth four times the amount of 
SERPS foregone.  Over time, the gap between the two closes and after age 50 the personal pension 
yields a smaller benefit than SERPS.  At this point, the individual is better to contract back in to 
SERPS.  This optimum switching strategy would result in a pension of £9,000 a year, compared with 
£5,000 from staying in SERPS.   
  
                                                           
29  State earnings-related pension scheme.  For more details on reform in the United Kingdom, see Disney and 
Whitehouse (1992a, b), Dilnot et al. (1994) and Whitehouse (1998).   
15 
Figure 5.  Switching incentives in the United Kingdom 
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Source: Whitehouse (1998), based on Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b) 
 
 The left-hand bars in Figure 6 show who switched in the first year of reform.  The 
government initially forecast that just 300,000 would switch, although a contingency plan allowed 
for a maximum of 500,000 switchers.  In the event, a total of 3.2 million, or 16 per cent of 
employees switched in 1988.  The failure to predict the numbers switching was because the 
Government Actuary looked solely at the incentive to switch on average, which was close to zero, and 
ignored the strong relationship with age (see National Audit Office, 1991 and Peacock, 1992).    
Switching rates were strongly related to age, as would be expected from Figure 5: 20 per cent 
of under 35s switched, compared with 5 per cent of over 35s.  By 1995, 5.6 million had taken out 
personal pensions.  However, the age pattern of the coverage of personal pensions changed over 
time.  For under 20s, the switching rate fell from 20 per cent to below 5 per cent, while it rose from 
20 to 40 per cent of the 25-34 age range.  Over the eight-year period, the average age of personal-
pension members rose from 29 to 33.  This suggests that younger workers were initially persuaded 
to switch, but that later cohorts of labor-market entrants have delayed this decision until their mid 
20s.  Taking account of workers already covered by employer plans, the effective switching rate 
overall was around 80 per cent for men aged 25-55 and 50 per cent for women.  Data on switching 
behavior by earnings show a constant picture.  For men earning below £7,500, take-up of personal 
pensions was 28 per cent, exactly the same rate as men earning over £12,500.  For women, the take-
up rates in these earnings ranges were 22 and 21 per cent respectively. 
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Figure 6.  Coverage of personal pensions in the United Kingdom 
by age, 1987 and 1995 (per cent of employees) 
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Source: Whitehouse (1998), based on one per cent sample of personal-pension members in Department 
of Social Security (1997); employment data from quarterly Labour Force Survey 
 
Figure 5 showed that the gains to switching for younger workers in the United Kingdom 
were very large. Between 1988-89 and 1995-96, the government paid some £17.7 billion in rebates 
of social-security contributions into individuals’ pension accounts30, around 8 per cent of total 
contribution revenues.  But these rebates were far larger than the eventual savings on SERPS 
benefits in the next century, which Whitehouse (1998) calculates at £9.2 billion.  The net cost — 
£8.5 billion — arises because the government did not adjust the contribution to personal pensions 
to take account of their increased return and the reduced value of SERPS benefits for younger 
workers.  (See the discussion above on minimizing the fiscal costs of the transition).  The 
government has since reduced the rebate and adjusted it with age to match the SERPS benefits 
foregone more closely.  The net annual cost of contracting out has fallen from a peak of £1.8 billion 
a year to £0.5 billion.31   
 
Argentina 
 As in the United Kingdom, switching in Argentina was voluntary both for existing workers 
and for new labor-market entrants.  There was no defined-benefit guarantee to the value of the 
funded pension alternative as offered in Hungary, but switchers are able to move back to the public-
sector scheme for the first two years of the reform.  The reform was introduced in 1994.   
 Figure 7, giving data for 1996, shows a strong inverse relationship between switching and 
age, as shown in Hungary and the United Kingdom.  There is some evidence of lower switching 
rates among the very youngest workers, similar to that in the United Kingdom.  However, figures 
that are more recent suggest that switching rates have risen to close to 100 per cent for new labor-
market entrants.  As it becomes of residual importance, a logical step would be to phase out the old 
scheme eventually.    
 
                                                           
30  Department of Social Security (1997), Table H1.01.   
31  Government Actuary’s calculations published in Pension Provision Group (1998), Figure 7.1.   
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Figure 7.  Coverage of funded pensions in Argentina by age and sex, 1996 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones (1997) 
 
Chile 
 The Chilean reform of 1981 involved a complete transfer of the pension system into private, 
funded accounts.  The government’s role is limited to guaranteeing minimum pensions and pension 
fund returns32.  Switching was compulsory for new labor-market entrants (beginning in 1983), but 
voluntary for the existing workforce.  Once an individual had switched to the new scheme, there 
was no option to switch back.  Figure 8 shows switching rates by age in 1985.  It shows a similar 
pattern to other countries, with switching strongly inversely correlated with age.  The rate close to 
100 per cent for the youngest workers partly reflects the fact that switching was compulsory for new 
labor-market entrants from 1983.  
 The Chilean switching strategy is notable for several reasons.  First, it is somewhat surprising 
that the authoritarian government of the time opted for a voluntary switch.  Secondly, despite being 
the first reform of its kind anywhere in the world, a very high percentage of workers chose to switch 
to the new system.  This was due partly to the inefficiency of the old scheme and partly to an 
aggressive public-relations campaign.  However, financial incentives — lower payroll taxes and 
generously valued recognition bonds — were also important.   
 
                                                           
32   These include the minimum pension guarantee, the relative return guarantee and the guarantee on part of the 
annuity.   These are described in Bertin and Perrotto (1997).   
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Figure 8.  Coverage of funded pensions in Chile by age, 1985 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones (1985) 
 
Colombia 
Like the Argentine reform, the Colombian reform of 1994 was voluntary both for existing 
workers and for new labor-market entrants.  Switching was a relatively low risk option, because 
individuals had an indefinite right to return to the old system and a defined-benefit guarantee 
underpins the performance of the defined-contribution pension funds.  Figure 9 shows a similar 
pattern to other countries, with switching rates for younger workers around 90 per cent.  However, 
the decline in switching with age is much more rapid than other countries, with switching rates of 
only 10 per cent for 45-54 year olds, compared with over 50 per cent in Argentina and Chile.   
Unlike other Latin-American countries, the Colombian public-pension scheme had not been 
discredited and was not experiencing serious financial difficulties.  After the reform, the pay-as-you-
go scheme still promised a replacement rate of 85 percent of final earnings, indexed to wage growth 
for a full career worker.  This implied a high rate of return with which the new funded scheme had 
to compete.  For older workers, the policy risk in the public scheme was relatively low and the 
accumulation period in the funded scheme would be relatively short.  For younger workers, the 
opposite was true and in any case, they could always switch back to the public scheme. 
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Figure 9.  Coverage of funded pensions in Colombia by age, 1997 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ASOFONDOS (1997) 
 
Peru 
 The new pension system in Peru, introduced in 1993, was also voluntary for both existing 
workers and new entrants.  Although there was no guarantee of the funded pension value, 
individuals, as in Argentina, could switch back for the first two years of the reform.  Switching rates 
show the same inverse correlation with age as in other countries, but switching rates of 60 per cent 
for younger workers were lower than in other Latin American countries, where they approached 100 
per cent.  This probably reflects the lack of clearly defined rules for recognition-bond calculations 
and of a minimum pension guarantee.  
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Figure 10.  Coverage of funded pensions in Peru by age and sex, 1997 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 >65
age in 1997
men
women
all
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Superintendencia de Administradoras Privadas de 
Fondos de Pensiones, Peru (1995) 
 
 
Uruguay  
 Uruguay’s switching policy is the most complex in Latin America.  In 1996, approximately 
30,000 workers below age 40 and with incomes equivalent to 5,000 pesos a month (in May 1995 
values) were forced to switch, as were new entrants with incomes above this level.  Workers with 
incomes below 7,500 pesos a month received an additional incentive to join the funded scheme, 
since their benefits in the public scheme were reduced by a quarter while half of their payroll 
contribution was diverted to the second pillar.  The government had anticipated that, at most, 
another 50,000 would voluntarily switch to the mixed scheme. However, external analysis by 
Marquez (1997) suggested that workers under age 40 would gain from switching to the funded 
scheme.  This analysis was borne out be experience.  By the end of 1996, the number of voluntary 
switchers was six times higher than official projections.  By mid-1997, over 400,000 workers had 
joined the new scheme. 
 Figure 11 shows switching as of October 1996.  Unfortunately, the data are not available on 
a disaggregated basis above age 40.  Nevertheless, it is safe to say that a very small percentage of 
older workers had chosen to switch to the funded scheme by this time. The 400,000 switchers 
recorded by mid-1997 are almost equivalent to the number of contributors under age 40.  
Preliminary evidence suggests younger workers were overcompensated in the switching process.  
They would have been willing to switch even if the defined benefit had been reduced by more than a 
quarter.  The switching conditions were probably overgenerous and the fiscal cost of the transition 
greater than required. 
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Figure 11.  Coverage of funded pensions in Uruguay by age and sex, 1996 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Banco de Prevision Social (1997) 
 
 
7. Forced switching 
Three countries — Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Mexico — have chosen to force all workers to 
switch to the new private scheme.  Not coincidentally, all three countries have completely replaced 
public schemes with private schemes.33  Indeed, the desire to bring the public scheme to a definitive 
conclusion is one of the driving factors behind the choice of a mandatory switch.  However, there 
are several disadvantages to this strategy.  
 
Bolivia and Kazakhstan 
The Kazakh and Bolivian reforms force all workers to transfer to the private scheme and to 
accept the valuation method chosen to recognize their years of contributions to the old defined-
benefit plan.  One disadvantage is that some workers may challenge this valuation either in the 
courts or in a political forum.  This type of legal challenge was the main reason that reformers in 
Argentina and Hungary abandoned plans to set an arbitrary cut-off age.  The fact that such 
challenges have not arisen in Kazakhstan and Bolivia might suggest fundamental differences in the 
legal system or political economy compared with other reforming countries.  In Kazakhstan, the 
reform took a distinctly “top down” form with little input from interest groups or the general 
public.34   Another possibility is that the reform was generous enough to pre-empt criticism.  In 
                                                           
33   The government role is still present in the form of the minimum pension guarantees in Kazakhstan and Mexico 
and the new benefit paid to all citizens in Bolivia.   In the terminology of World Bank (1994), these remain 
multipillar schemes. 
34  Orenstein (1998).   
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Bolivia, a forced switch was also facilitated by the ‘Bonosol’, which provides annuities to all 
Bolivians over the age of 65 financed by privatization proceeds.35   
While reformers may be able to implement a forced switch under certain conditions, this 
may increase the potential for later reversal of the reform.  For example, if benefits in the first years 
of the reform are perceived to be lower than under the public scheme, participants who had been 
forced to switch may have a strong claim against the government for their lost defined-benefit 
rights.  Another possibility is that a forced switch may be easier to reverse in the case leadership 
changes hands.  After all, the switch to the private scheme was not the decision of the voters but of 
a leadership that has since been rejected by those voters. 
 To minimize political or legal resistance to the reform while maintaining the forced 
switching element, the government may be forced to offer a win-win solution to all involved.  This 
could lead to a much higher valuation of terminated defined-benefit rights than would have been 
necessary to get the majority of workers to switch.  Without the ability to price discriminate, the 
government would have to pay all participants the higher rate (i.e., an intramarginal subsidy) in order 
to ensure support.  Workers would have an incentive to inflate their defined-benefit claims further 
raising fiscal costs.  Of course, in a forced switch, the true value workers ascribe to their defined-
benefit pension promise can never be known.  True preferences are revealed in a voluntary switch. 
 
 Mexico 
 The Mexican reform provides a clearer example of the tradeoffs that arise when reformers 
desire an immediate switch for all workers but are constrained concerning valuation of acquired 
rights.  These rights, defined as the ability to continue in the pay-as-you-go scheme, were enshrined 
in the Mexican Constitution.  With this constraint, the only way that the government could achieve 
an immediate closure of the public defined-benefit scheme was to guarantee switchers that they 
would get at least as much as they would have if they had remained in the pay-as-you-go scheme.  
The Mexican lifetime switchback option changes the nature of the switch completely.  In a sense, no 
one was forced to switch to the private scheme since all are guaranteed the pay-as-you-go benefit.  
For older workers, for whom reliance on the pay-as-you-go scheme is inevitable, there is no 
justification for the switch whatsoever.  In fact, older workers who are disinterested in the 
performance of their private fund may reduce the efficiency of the sector and its positive impact on 
capital markets.  The costs of administering their accounts are a deadweight loss to society.   
 
 
 
8. Managing switching behavior 
Most countries have chosen to allow voluntary switching, although four countries —Croatia, 
El Salvador, Poland, and Uruguay — chose some compulsion for younger workers.  Two more — 
Bolivia and Kazakhstan— forced all workers to switch.  El Salvador and Uruguay allow different 
switching conditions according to income level and gender.  In the Chilean, Hungarian and Mexican 
cases, only new workers were forced to switch in a definitive manner.  Argentina and Colombia 
                                                           
35  The Bonosol program was replaced with a less generous benefit, the Bolivida, after the reform package had 
already been passed. 
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continue to leave the door open to the public scheme even for new entrants.  Countries’ experience 
covers the entire range of options.   
 Compulsion for workers with vested rights in the defined-benefit plan has several 
disadvantages, especially for workers close to retirement.  The fact that only two countries chose this 
policy supports this contention.  Furthermore, we speculate that Bolivia had special circumstances 
related to the provision of the Bonosol which, when added to a relatively generous valuation of past 
rights, resulted in a favorable outcome for most workers.  Sources in Kazakhstan report that in the 
first year of the reform, it is not well understood by the public.  Even younger workers had to be 
forced into the new plan because of the intention to reduce long-run target benefit levels.   
 The pattern of switching in countries with a voluntary reform showed a consistent pattern.  
Switching is strongly and inversely correlated with age in all cases.  The analysis of incentives in 
Hungary and the United Kingdom showed that this would be expected given the structure of 
switching incentives.  Other countries are likely to show a similar incentive pattern because of 
backloaded accruals in defined-benefit schemes and the effect of compound interest on defined-
contribution returns.  Younger workers are likely to perceive greeter risk that the state scheme will 
be reformed  in the future and that pay-as-you-go benefits will be less than initially promised.  Both 
of these point to higher switching rates for younger workers.  However, in Argentina, Peru and the 
United Kingdom, switching rates were lower for the very youngest workers.  This is probably a 
result of myopia: younger workers give little thought to their income 40-or-so years ahead.  Where 
data are available divided by sex, fewer women are found to switch.  The only exception is 
Hungary.36  This reflects the smaller incentive to switch in the United Kingdom, but in other 
countries the incentives were the same for both sexes.  Finally, where forecasts were made of the 
numbers switching, they tended to be exceeded (in the United Kingdom and Uruguay, hugely 
exceeded).  However, this usually reflects poor microeconomic analysis of the incentive to switch.   
 
Policy options  
Governments have a number of policy options for influencing the numbers who switch 
voluntarily.  The importance of the proportion switching for the success of the reform and for its 
impact on the public finances suggests that these policies should be considered carefully.  
First, the design of the system can affect opportunities for switching.  Only a limited window 
was offered in many countries for switching out of the pay-as-you-go-scheme.  This window could 
be extended if too few workers switched initially.  If inertia is likely to be important, the numbers 
switching can be affected by the default position specified by the government.  For example, all 
current and future workers in Argentina were given a choice between the funded and pay-as-you-go 
options.  But the default for younger workers is that they will be switched.  This policy could be 
adapted so that, for example, all workers under age 30 would default to the funded option, while all 
over age 30 defaulted to the pay-as-you-go plan.     
Secondly, policies can be adjusted to affect directly the incentive to switch by altering the 
value of pensions in different options.  For example in Hungary, the initial reform proposal would 
have given younger workers far larger benefits from switching, but the government feared that 
switching would exceed their forecast.  By reducing the first-pillar pension accrual rate over time, the 
returns from switching for younger workers were reduced.  An alternative method of adjusting the 
incentive would be to alter the contribution rate to the second pillar with age.  This policy was 
                                                           
36  These data are, however, preliminary and cover only 1 per cent of employees.  
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adopted in the United Kingdom when it was found that incentives for younger workers to switch 
were too large.  A single contribution rate of 7.8 per cent was reduced to 5.8 per cent, and, in 1996, 
was replaced by an age-related contribution ranging between 2.3 and 9 per cent.   
Thirdly, incentives to switch can be affected indirectly.  Some countries have offered 
guarantees of the funded pension value, which clearly reduces the risk of choosing this option and 
increases the incentive to switch.  Also, some countries offer opportunities to switch back to the 
pay-as-you-go option if returns do not meet expectations (see Table 2).   
Finally, the information available to workers is important in affecting their switching 
decision. The United Kingdom raises the problem of pension mis-selling in a voluntary switch, 
where people are persuaded to switch when it is not in their interests.37  Part of the problem in the 
United Kingdom relates to the unique, complex interaction between existing employer-provided 
pension plans and the new defined-contribution accounts.  But this risk could occur elsewhere.  
Returning to Figure 2, workers over the age of 40 could be persuaded to switch, and if capital-
market returns turn out as expected, then their pension would be below their pay-as-you-go 
entitlement.   
Governments have three possible strategies for dealing with the mis-selling issue.  First, they 
can offer a guarantee or a window for switching back for workers who make the ‘wrong’ decision.  
Secondly, regulation can be used to curb the excesses of those marketing private pensions.  Thirdly, 
they can provide information to try to promote rational decision making.  In the first year of its 
reform, Hungary aims to minimize switching errors by disseminating a simulation model of the 
returns to different pension options.  The model is available on the Internet and at a dozen or so 
information centers located around the country as well as mobile centers.  The new private pension 
funds also use this official model to inform prospective clients.  Combined with consumer 
protection initiatives and a window for reversing the switching decisions, the Hungarian 
policymakers hope to see a close relationship between switching behavior and incentives.  
 
9. Conclusions and recommendations 
This paper has considered a critical question in the design of pension reform: who should be 
permitted, persuaded or mandated to join the new pension system.  We showed a range of possible 
options, from an entirely voluntary switch to an entirely mandatory one, via schemes that are 
mandatory for some workers but voluntary for others.  Pension reforms in 13 countries include all 
possible models.  We argued that older workers are best excluded from reform because the 
economic returns from switching their pensions are likely to be too small to justify the efforts and 
that the required subsidies or guarantees to persuade them of the benefit of reform are likely to be 
high.  However, having a defined cut-off age for switching is also problematic.  It raises the issue of 
intergenerational equity, treating individuals on either side of the (necessarily arbitrary) cut-off age 
differently.  It also assumes that cohorts are homogeneous in their attitudes to pension reform and 
to uncertainty of pension values, which is unlikely.  For these reasons, we argue that voluntary 
switching is superior.   
Most countries have chosen a partially or completely voluntary switch.  The principle 
objections to a voluntary switch are the continuation of the pay-as-you-go scheme, increasing 
administrative costs, and uncertainty from the government’s perspective over how many people will 
choose the different options.  But the empirical evidence shows remarkably similar patterns 
                                                           
37  See Whitehouse (1998), section V.    
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confirming that, at least in a broad sense, the switching pattern can be anticipated.  A rapid 
transition distinguished from a gradual transition.  Depending on the objectives, the switching 
process can be influenced by several policy levers.  Governments can change the conditions of the 
switch for current workers by adjusting the value of their historical contributions.  This valuation 
should take into account the age-related incentives of the funded scheme.  They can alter the 
contribution rate for the funded scheme or change the design of a reformed pay-as-you-go scheme 
to affect the incentive to switch.  The latter option reduces public pension obligations and helps 
finance the transition.  They can also affect the incentive indirectly, by adjusting explicit or implicit 
guarantees of the minimum pension, manipulating the default option or the changing the window 
for switching out of the state scheme.  The government should help ensure that workers understand 
these conditions by providing the information workers will need to make an informed choice. 
26 
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